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By  Duncan  Rose. 


With  Opinions  by 

LIEUT.  GEN.  STEPHEN  D.  LEE,  C.  S.  A. 
LIEUT.  GEN.  JOSEPH   WHEELER,  C.  S.  A. 
BRIG.  GEN.  E.  P.  ALEXANDER,  C.  S.  A. 
MAJ.  GEN.  E.  M.  LAW,  C.  S.  A. 
MAJ.  GEN.  DON  CARLOS  BUELL,  U.  S.  A. 
MAJ.  GEN.  O.  O.  HOWARD,  U.  S.  A.    AND 
MAJ.  GEN.  JACOB  D.  COX,  U.  S.  A. 


Republished  at  Courtesy   of    the   Century    Magazine. 

The  @ape  Fear  fress, 

Fayetteville  N.  C 


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By  Duncan  Rose, 


With  Opinions  by 

LIEUT.  GEN.  STEPHEN  D.  LEE,  C.  S.  A 
LIEUT.  GEN.  JOSEPFJ   WHEELER,  C.  S.  A 
BRIG.  GEN.  E.  P.  ALEXANDER,  C.  S.  A. 
MAJ.  GEN.  E.  M.  LAW,  C.  S.  A. 
MAJ.  GEN.  DON  CARLOS  BUELL,  U.  S.  A. 
MAJ.  GEN.  0.  0.  HOWARD,  U.  S.  A.    AND 
MAJ.  GEN.  JACOB  D.  COX,  U.  S.  A. 


Re-published  by  Courtesy   of   the   Century   Magazine;. 
Fayetteville  N.  C. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2013 


http://archive.org/details/whyconfederacyfaOOrose 


lagazine,   Nov.  1896. 


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Q^  ^ET — THE   POLICY 

'      THE   CAVALRY. 


rhy  did  the  seceding  states 
161-65?"  the  chances  are 
is  likely  that  he  will  say 
>uld  win;  that  America 
•  one  great  nation;  that 
r  natural  boundaries,  but 
ffort  to  divide  it,  not  be- 
ot  make  such  an  answer 
specially  if  he  is  a  South- 
by  the  superior  numbers 
■st  of  these  answers  is  not 
ided  to  happen.  If  the 
:ort  to  separate  from  the 
selves,  it  could  have  been 
I  to  be  so.  As  to  the  one- 
are  also  a  part  of  this  one 
separated  from  us  by   im- 


vjv 


~  P  aches  that  in  a  war  for  in- 
not  count.  For  instance, 
nded  by  hostile  kingdoms 
ce  upward  of  six  hundred 
pet  it  has,  and  has  always 
le  principality  of  Montene- 
he    fall  of    Constantinople, 

The  Dutch  republic,  Scot- 

land  under  Wallace  and  Bruce,  Prussia  under  Frederick  II  in  the 
Seven  Years'  War,  and  America  in  the  Revolution,  all  succeeded 
with  greater  odds  of  numbers  against  them  than  were  opposed  to 
the  seceding  States.  And  to  day,  Cuba,  with  only  a  million  and  a 
half  of  populatioh  seems  to  be  successfully  fighting  Spain  with   her 


everrxreixn-i 


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■33N3aMOd'53MaO 


3   dOd    03Sfl    3S    AVI1    MOH3B   3DVda    3HJ.5 


f  From  the  Century  Magazine,   Nov.  1896. 

WHY  THE  CONFEDERACY  FAILED. 

THE    EXCESSIVE    ISSUE    OF    PAPER    MONET — THE   POLICY    CF 
DISEER8ION — THE   NEGLECT    OF    THE   CA.VALRY. 


H^  a  person  be  a9ked  the  question  "Why  did  the  seceding  states 
fail  to  win  independence  in  the  war  of  1861- Go?"  the  chances  are 
that  he  will  make  one  of  two  answers.  It  is  likely  that  he  will  say 
that  it  was  never  intended  that  they  should  win;  that  America 
was  designed  by  Almighty  Providence  tor  one  great  nation;  that 
it  is  not  divided  by  interior  seas  and  other  natural  boundaries,  but 
is  essentially  one  country;  and  that  any  tffort  to  divide  it,  not  be- 
ing a  good  cause,  must  fail.  If  he  does  not  make  such  an  answer 
as  this,  it  is  probable  that  he  will  say — especially  if  he  is  a  South* 
erner — that  the  South  was  overpowered  by  the  superior  numbers 
and  resources  of  the  North.  Now,  the  first  of  these  answers  is  not 
satisfying.  Whatever  happens  is  intended  to  happen.  If  the 
Southern  States  had  succeded  in  their  effort  to  separate  from  the 
North  and  set  up  a  government  for  themselves,  it  could  have  been 
said  with  equal  truth  that  it  was  intended  to  be  so.  As  to  the  one- 
ness  of  the  country,  Canada  and  MexiGo  are  also  a  part  of  this  one 
country;  for  hundreds  of  miles  they  are  separated  from  us  by  im- 
aginary lines  only. 

As  to  the  other  answer,  all  history  teaches  that  in  a  war  for  in- 
dependence superiority  in  numbers  does  not  count.  For  instance, 
the  little  republic  of  Switzerland,  surrounded  by  hostile  kingdoms 
and  empires  in  arms,  won  its  independence  upward  of  six  hundred 
years  ago,  and  it  is  independent  to  day,  yet  it  has,  and  has  always 
had,  only  an  army  of  militia.  The  little  principality  of  Montene- 
gro has  been  fighting  the  Turks  since  the  fall  of  Constantinople, 
even  before  the  discovery  of  America.  The  Dutch  republic,  Scot- 
land  under  Wallace  and  Bruce,  Prussia  under  Frederick  II  in  the 
Seven  Years'  War,  and  America  in  the  Revolution,  all  succeeded 
with  greater  odds  of  numbers  against  them  than  were  opposed  to 
the  seceding  States.  And  to  day,  Cuba,  with  only  a  million  and  a 
half  of  populatioh  seems  to  be  successfully  fighting  Spain  with   her 


Why  Ths  BonfQ&micy  Failed, 

nearly  twenty  millions.  No,  in  a  war  for  independence  mere  num- 
bers do  not  count,  and  it  has  not  often  happened  in  the  history  of 
the  world  that  a  people  who  have  fought  wiih  such  desperate  valor 
as  the  Confederates  displayed  have  failed  to  win  independence. 

As  to  material  resources,  there  is  no  region  under  the  sun  more 
blessed  in  natural  resources  for  waging  war  than  the  territory  of 
the  eleven  seceding  States.  Within  their  own  borders  was  to  be 
found  everything  necessary  for  arming,  equipping,  feeding  and 
clothing  their  armies.  Ihe  history  of  the  industrial  development. 
of  the  South  during  the  war  has  never  yet  been  written.  It  is  even 
more  wonderful  than  that  of  its  armies  in  the  field,  and  is  the  most 
striking  proof  of  that  versatility  and  ingenuity  which  are  peculiar 
to  the  American  people.  Before  the  war  it  was  purely  an  agricul- 
tural people;  there  were  no  shipyards,  dockyards,  factories,  or  ma> 
chine-shops,  to  speak  of.  Within  a  few  months  after  hostilities  be- 
gan these  farmers  and  planters  were  building  ironclads,  marine 
boilers  and  engines,  torpedoes  and  torpedo-boats.  When  Sumter 
was  fired  upon  there  was  not  a  powder  factory  in  all  the  land;  soon 
almost  every  village  had  its  piles  of  refuse  for  making  saltpeter,  and 
before  the  war  ended  the  factories  in  Georgia  and  North  Carolina 
could  have  supplied  all  the  armies  iu  the  field  with  gunpowder. 
Cotton  factories  had  also  been  built,  and  were  all  at  work  making 
cloth  for  the  soldiers.  And  there  was  plenty  of  food  in  the  South, 
though  the  soldiers  failed  to  get  their  share  of  it,  for  corn  had  taken 
the  place  of  cotton  in  the  fields,  and  there  was  abundance  of  cattle 
and  hogs.  In  the  last  year  of  the  war  Sherman's  army  marched 
through  the  South,  living  upcn  the  fat  of  the  land,  while  Lee's 
men  were  starving  in  the  trenches  before  Petersburg.  No;  there 
was  no  lack  of  men  and  warlike  resources  in  the  South;  tLe 
causes  of  failure  must  be  looked  for  elsewhere. 

A  few  have  intimated  that  the  cause  of  failure  was  that  the 
hearts  of  the  Southern  people  were  not  really  in  the  war,  and  there- 
fore they  did  not  persevere  and  support  the  government  as  other- 
wise  they  would  have  done.  There  was  never  a  greater  slander 
cast  upon  a  brave  people.  It  was  the  people's  war.  The  party 
tor  the  Union  disappeared  when  the  conflict  began.  The  people 
proved  that  their  hearts  were  in  the  struggle  by  their  sacrifices  and 
sufferings;  and  if  further  proof  were  necessary  their  conduct  to- 
ward the  survivors  of  the  Confederate  army  and  the  dead  of  the 
Lost  Cause  would  be  sufficient. 

Then,  if  the  South  had  the  men  and  the  warlike  resources,  and 
they  were  in  earnest,  how  came  it  to  pass  that,  unlike  other  brave 
peoples,  they  failed  to  win  independence?  How  came  their  efforts 
to  be  so  misdirected? 

Three  principal  causes  contributed  to  the  fall  of  the  Confederacy: 


Whtj  The  Gtmfz&et&cy  Failed. 

1.       THE    EXCESSIVE   ISSUE    OF    PAPER    MONET. 

JJ,       THE   POLICY   OF   DISPERSION. 

3.       THE   NEGLECT    OF    THE   CAVALRY. 

1.  The  Confederate  government  was  smothered  and  strangled 
to  death  with  its  own  irredeemable  paper  money. 

It  has  been  proved  beyond  shadow  of  doubt  and  cavil  that  war 
cannot  be  waged  with  paper  money.  Our  forefathers  proved  it  in 
the  war  of  the  Revolution,  and  had  not  the  French  and  Dutch  come 
to  their  rescue  with  real  money,  the  American  government,  under 
its  flood  of  continental  bills,  would  have  been  strangled  like  the 
Confederacy,  and  would  likewise  have  "died  aborning."  However 
well  or  ill  paper  bills  may  answer  for  money  in  time  of  peace,  in 
time  of  war  they  will  not  do.  The  "sinews  of  wai"  mean  specie 
and  nothing  but  specie,  And  to  get  specie,  and  those  things  which 
specie  alone  will  buy,  there  mu3t  be  taxe3,  taxes,  and  taxes.  A 
people  who  are  unwilling  to  be  taxed  have  no  business  to  engage  in 
war.  The  Southern  people  knew  that  war  meant  taxes,  and  they 
were  willing  to  be  taxed  to  carry  on  the  war.  The  sacrifices  they 
made,  the  eagerness  with  which  they  loaned  their  money  to  the 
government,  bought  its  bonds,  and  took  its  paper  money  showed 
that  they  were  willing  to  be  taxed. 

But  the  Southern  people  were  not  fighting  for  independence  only. 
They  were  contending  as  well  for  a  certain  theory  of  government. 
In  ordar  to  be  consistent  with  this  theory —  as  their  leaders  con- 
ceived it — it  was  necessary,  in  framing  a  constitution,  to  render  it 
unlawful  for  the  government  to  tax  the  lands  and  goods  of  the  peo- 
ple, except  under  conditions  which  made  all  taxation  of  property  by 
the  general  government  impossible.  According  to  this  theory,  as 
they  interpreted  it,  the  government  might  lawfully  order  a  man  to 
shoulder  his  gun  and  march  to  the  front  to  be  shot  at  with  ritle  and 
cannon,  but  could  not  levy  a  tax  upon  his  property  to  feed  and 
clothe  him  while  fighting  for  his  country ! 

So,  taxation  of  property  being  forbidden  by  fundamental  law,  and 
tariff  or  customs  taxation  of  no  avail  because  of  blockaded  ports, 
there  was  really  nothing  that  the  Confederate  government  could  do 
to  raise  money  except  issue  bonds  and  paper  bills.  Of  these,  before 
the  war  ended,  between  one  and  two  thou -and  million  of  dollars  — 
nominal  value — were  emitted,  the  paper  bills  amounting  to  nearly 
one  billion,  or  over  one  half  of  the  whole.  Nor  does  this  include  the 
millions  of  paper  bills  issued  by  state  authority  and  by  banks,  of 
which  it  would  be  hard  to  give  even  an  approximate  estimate. 
During  the  same  time — to  the  end  of  18 64 — there  was  raised  by 
taxation  only  the  sum  of  forty-eight  millions  of  dollars,,  and  that  in 
paper  money.  It  too  might  just  as  well  have  been  printed,  for  then 
the  cost  of  collection  would  haze  been  saved.     What  more  need  be 


8, 

Wuj  The  Gcxxifed&xncy  Failed. 

• 

faid  to  show  why  the  Confederacy  failed? 

Ah,  those  beautiful  paper  bills,  so  nice  and  clean  and  pretty,  bat 
every  one  as  deadly  a  foe  to  the  South  as  an  armed  enemy  !  And 
how  the  people  ran  to  get  them  !  And  how  those  printing-presses 
rumbled  —  all  a-printing  paper  money  !  They  shook  the  earth,  and 
almost  drowned  the  noise  of  the  cannon  wheels  rolling  to  the  front. 
A  Southerner  should  hate  tin  sight  of  one  of  those  paper  bills. 
Every  one  of  them  represents  blood  fruitlessly  spilled,  treasure 
wastsd,  and  hopes  blasted. 

But  in  the  beginning  of  the  struggle  no  one  seemed  to  suspect  an 
enemy  in  that  beautiful  mouey.  The  government,  at  least,  acted 
upon  the  theory  that  all  it  bad  to  do  to  raise  money  was  to  print  it. 
They  did  not  seem  to  realize  that,  being  the  largest  purchaser  in  the 
market,  it  was  necessary  for  the  government  to  keep  down  prices  as 
much  as  possible;  that  every  issue  of  bills  must  inevitably  raise  pri- 
ces, and  render  a  new  issue  necessary;  and  that  every  rise  in  prices 
must  be  followed  by  a  new  issue,  until  the  bubble  must  collapse  of 
its  own  expansion  and  redundancy. 

At  last  the  lesson  was  learned  that  a  printing-press  cannot  take 
the  place  of  a  tax-collector  in  providing  the  sinews  of  war,  but  it 
was  then  too  late;  the  giant  was  already  prostrate  and  helpless. 
When  it  had  come  to  pass  that  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy  were 
starving  and  freezing  in  camps  and  trenches,  the  government  having 
not  the  means  to  buy  them  food  and  clothing;  when  it  had  come  to 
pass  that  the  War  Department  was  compelled  to  pay  a  thousand  of 
those  paper  dollars  for  a  pair  cf  army  boots;  when  it  bad  come  to 
pass  that  a  raonths  pay  of  soldier  would  not  buy  him  a  single  ration 
of  bread  and  meat,  the  lesson  was  then  learned;  but  it  was  too  late. 
In  the  last  gasp  of  the  struggle  the  government  attempted  to  aban- 
don and  throw  oS  its  make-believe  money;  but  it  was  already  buri- 
ed, smothering  and  strangling  under  an  avalanche,  a  mountain  of 
paper  dollars. 

2.       THE   POLICY    OF    DISPERSION. 

The  frontiers  ol  the  Conftderacy  extended  over  many  thousands 
of  miles.  The  policy  which  the  government  adopted  in  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  and  upheld  to  the  end  was  that  every  foot  of  that 
frontier  must  be  defended.  To  this  end,  the  whole  Confederacy 
wa3  divided  into  military  districts,  and  to  each  general  there  was 
given  "a  definite  geographical  command",  as  the  President  of  the 
Confederacy  himself  stated  it.  So  the  defense  of  the  Confederacy 
was  made  a  question  of  geography.  Each  general  of  a  district 
was  expected  to  drive  back  all  enemies  crossing  his  frontier,  without 
much  regard  to  what  was  going  on  in  the  other  districts. 

The  better  to  carry  out  this  idea,  the  capital  was  removed  from 
Montgomery  in  the  interior  to  Richmond,  near  the  frontier  "where 


Why  The  ^onfefleraetj  Failed. 

it  was  expected  that  most  of  the  fighting  would  take  place".  And 
the  defense  of  the  shallow  sounds  of  North  Carolina  in  the  rear  of 
Richmond  was  deemed  of  more  importance  than  that  of  the  passes 
of  the  Appalachians. 

A  policy  more  fatal  to  success  could  not  have  been  adopted. 
The  armies  of  the  Confederacy  were  wrecked  and  wasted  in  the  vain 
effort  to  defend  its  capital  and  the  extended,  indefensible  frontier. 
Every  great  pitched  battle  of  the  war,  unless  Chicamauga  be  an  ex- 
ception, was  fought  within  a  day's  march  of  the  frontier,  or  of  nav- 
igable water,  which  was  in  effect  the  frontier,  because  the  Federals 
with  their  gunboats  held  all  the  navigable  waters.  Wherever  the 
Federals  chose  to  throw  down  the  gauntlet  of  battle,  the  Confede- 
rates immediately  picked  it  up.  The  fighting  was  glorious,  magnif- 
icent there  has  never  been  any  better  fighting  in  all  the  history  of 
the  world.  But  the  Federals  were  always  well  fed  and  clothed, 
and  never  lacked  for  ammunition  and  army  supplies,  becasue  the 
Confederates  were  willing  to  do  the  fighting  within  gunshot  of  the 
Federal  gunboats  and  transports. 

And  so  the  great  advantage  which  the  Confederates  might  have 
had  in  the  contest — that  of  ''fighting  from  a  center" — was  delibe- 
rately thrown  away.  It  never  seemed  to  occur  to  those  in  author- 
ity that  the  battles  for  the  Confederacy  should  be  fought,  not  upon 
the  tidal  waters  of  Virginia,  or  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi — "that 
great  inland  sea" — and  its  navigable  tributaries,  but  with  concen- 
trated armies  upon  the  flanks  of  the  Appalachians. 

When  Bragg  was  sent  through  Cumberland  Gap  to  occupy 
eastern  Kentucky,  the  purpose  was  not  to  change  the  seat  of  the 
war,  but  to  make  a  "diversion",  and  to  "relieve  the  pressure  on  the 
Mississippi".  But  what  could  poor  Bragg  do,  invading  the  rich 
and  powerful  North  with  his  little  army  of  thirty  thousand  men? 
And  yet  he  has  been  blamed  because  he  did  not  capture  Cincinnati. 
He  did  very  well,  considering  bis  opportunities.  And  even  at  the 
very  time  while  Bragg  was  making  his  "diversion"  in  Kentucky, 
twice  as  many  men  as  he  had  in  all  his  army  were  scattered  in 
garrisons  along  the  Gulf  coast,  absolutely  doing  nothing.  But  the 
frontiers  must  be  defended,  and  the  capital  too,  if  it  took  the  last 
drop  of  Confederate  blood  !  — Such  was  the  policy  of  dispersion. 

A  lesson  might  have  been  learned  from  the  war  of  the  Revolu- 
tion; for  in  that  war  the  capital  of  the  country  was  changed  no 
fewer  than  nine  limes,  and  the  British  armies  marched  from  one  end 
of  the  thirteen  colonies  to  the  other;  yet  America  was  not  conquered: 
or  from  that  greatest  defensive  war  of  ancient  or  modern  times, 
wherein  Frederick  II  of  Prussia  maintained  the  independence  of  his 
country  against  combined  contiaental  Europe.  With  the  Austrian 
armies  in  his  front,  the  French  on  his  flanks,  and  the  Russians  and 


10 

Why  The  Confederacy  Failed. 

Swedes  pillaging  his  capital  in  bis  rear,  not  a  battalion  of  bis  army 
would  he  risk  merely  to  hold  territory.  For  six  of  these  seven 
bloody  years  he  did  not  even  see  bis  capital.  '"Let  the  frontiers 
and  the  capital  take  care  of  themselves;  the  heart  of  Prussia  is  her 
array  !  "  And  so,  attacking  and  retreating,  marching  and  counter- 
marching, delivering  terrible  blows  whenever  he  could  strike  to  ad- 
vantage, always  keeping  his  men  together  and  preventing  his  ene- 
mies from  concentrating,  he  fought  on,  furionsly,  desperately,  un- 
til the  fortune  of  war  changed,  and  the  last  armed  foe  was  driven 
from  his  country.  For  himself  he  won  the  well- deserved  title  of 
"the  Great",  Prussia  be  saved  from  the  fate  of  Poland,  and  for  all 
succeeding  ages  he  showed  bow  a  defensive  war  against  superior 
numbers  ought  to  be  fought.  — Such  were  ihe  results  of  the  policy 
of  concentration- 
It  would  have  been  better  for  tbe  Confederscy  if  the  government 
had  thought  that  the  "heart  of  the  Confederacy  was  her  army",  for 
territory  may  be  abandoned  and  yet  re-occupied,  and  a  city  may 
fall  and  yet  be  re-captured,  but  an  array  once  lost  is  gone  forever, 
a  soldier  once  dead  cannot  be  brought  back  to  life. 

According  to  the  policy  of  dispersion,  however,  it  was  not  the  ar- 
my that  was  to  be  protected,  but  the  territory  and  capital  of  the 
Confederacy.  And  so  fifteen  thousand  men  were  lost  at  l^ort  Don- 
elson  in  the  effort  to  defend  the  frontier  of  Tennessee;  thirty-two 
thousand  men  were  lost  at  Vicksburg  in  the  effort  to  defend  the 
frontier  tf  Mississippi;  and  thousands  of  brave  men,  untold  and  un- 
numbered, were  lost  in  those  terrible  battles  to  defend  Richmond, 
which  was  of  no  more  value  to  tbe  Confederacy  tban  Norfolk,  or 
any  other  city  upon  tide-water.  If  every  city  upon  the  seaboard 
had  been  evacuated  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  Confederates 
would  have  been  tbe  stronger  and  their  enemies  the  weaker  just  to 
the  extent  of  tbe  garrisons  which  were  necessary  to  hold  them.  In 
the  war  of  the  Revolution  tbe  British,  at  one  time  or  another,  occu- 
pied e7ery  Anerican  seaport  from  Maine  to  tbe  Florida  line;  the 
only  effect  of  it  was  to  relieve  the  Americans  of  the  trouble  and  ex- 
pense of  defending  them. 

From  first  to  last  tbe  armies  of  tbe  Confederacy  were  never  con- 
centrated. Of  all  the  six  hundred  thousand  men  in  arms  there  were 
never  got  together  upon  a  single  battlefield  more  than  seventy  thou- 
sand available  men.  -The  scattered  armies  wasted  away,  and  were 
destroyed  and  captured,  piecemeal,  while  trying  to  defend  tbe  fron- 
tiers, so  that  when  Sherman  was  ready  to  march  into  the  interior 
through  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas,  there  was  no  army  to  oppose 
him,  and  there  were  no  frontiers  to  defend-  The  cause  of  the  Con- 
federacy was  already  lost.  The  blocd  of  its  best  and  bravest  bad  been 
spilled  in  vain.  — Such  were  the  results  of  the  policy  of  dispersion. 


11 
Wh#  The  Gotife&tt&cy  Failed* 

3.  THE  NEGLECT  OF  THE  CAVALRY. 

it  is  a  fact  worthy  of  remembrance  that  all  the  greatest  generals  of 
ancient  and  modern  times  have  put  their  greatest  faith  in  their  cav- 
alry. It  was  his  6uperb  cavalry,  and  not  the  Macedonian  phalanx, 
with  which  Alexander  charged  the  Persian  center  at  Arbela,  and 
won  the  crown  of  Asia.  It  was  Hannibal's  Numidian  horse  that 
slaughtered  those  eighty  thousand  Romans  at  Cannae,  and  carried 
the  war  to  the  very  gates  of  Rome.  It  was  Napoleon's  powerful 
cavalry  reserve  at  Austerlitz  that  enabled  him  to  finish  off  that 
great  victory  with  the  capture  of  forty-three  thousand  Russian  and 
Austrian  prisoners,  and  a  hundred  pieces  of  artillery.  And  it  is  un- 
doubtedly true,  as  that  great  captain  himself  stated  it  to  be,  that 
his  success  at  Dresden  did  not  avail  to  save  his  throne  because  the 
horses  with  which  he  had  conquered  Europe  had  perished  in  the 
the  snows  of  the  Russian  steppes. 

The  Prussians  are  the  greatest  soldiers  of  modern  times,  and  they 
have  never  made  the  mistake  of  underrating  cavalry.  It  was  Blu- 
cher's  terrible  cavalry  which  changed  the  drawn  battle  of  Waterloo 
into  that  dreadful  rout,  and  which  pursued  the  dying  French  all 
that  awful  night  after  Waterloo,  until,  when  the  next  day  broke, 
there  was  not  an  organized  body  remaining  of  those  with  whom 
Napoleon  marched  out  to  fight.  And  in  her  last  war  it  was  the 
Prussian  uhlans  that  made  German  victories  so  effective,  and  made 
possible  Sedan  with  its  two  hundred  thousand  prisoners. 

And  so  it  it  has  come  to  be  considered  axiomatic,  that  however 
authorities  may  differ  as  to  the  relative  value  of  the  different  arms 
of  the  service  in  battle,  no  great  decisive  and  conclusive  victory 
can  be  won  without  sufficient  cavalry  to  press  the  pursuit;  that  the 
fruits  of  victory  cannot  be  gathered,  the  harvest  cannot  be  reaped 
without  sufficient  fresh  men  on  horseback  to  pursue  the  retreating 
enemy — and  this  for  the  simple  reason  that  pursuing  infantry  can- 
not overtake  a  retreating  enemy. 

It  might  be  expected  that  as  the  Southerners  were  natural  born 
horsemen,  "eavaliers  from  the  cradle",  the  mounted  arm  of  the  ser- 
vice would  have  been  the  strongest  and  the  most  esteemed  and  cher- 
ished; but,  strange  as  it  seems,  the  contrary,  the  very  contradicto- 
ry was  true.  From  the  beginning  the  cavalry  was  relatively  the 
weakest,  was  underrated  and  neglected,  and  even  ridiculed  and  de- 
rided. In  jocularity  rewards  were  offered  for  "a  dead  man  with 
spurs  on*' — such  a  poor  opinion  had  they  of  a  soldier  on  horseback  ! 

At  the  first  great  battle  of  the  war,  on  the  plateau  of  Manassas, 
the  mounted  men  did  not  even  fight  as  an  organized  body,  but  were 
divided,  detailed,  and  attached  two  companies  to  each  brigade,  in 
imitation,  perhaps,  of  the  old  Roman  legion,  a  method  of  arranging 
mounted  men  in  battle  which  was  abandoned   before  the  Christian 


12 

Why  The  Confederacy  Failed, 

era.  And  yet  Johnston  has  been  blamed  because  he  did  cot  capture 
McDowell's  array  and  the  city  of  Washington.  And  at  all  times 
after  that  the  little  band  of  horsemen  never  seemed  to  be  considered 
a  constituent  part  of  the  fighting  army.  Nearly  always  they  were 
separated  from  it  on  detached  duty.  At  Gettysburg  the  Confederate 
cavalry  was  miles  away  when  the  fight  began.  It  was  net  even  & 
factor  in  the  great  fight  until  the  last  day.  If  Lee  had  won,  and 
bad  captured  the  heights  of  Gettysburg,  it  could  not  have  been  in 
effect  more  than  a  drawn  battle,  because  he  had  not  sufficient  caval- 
ry with  which  to  press  the  pursuit. 

And  so,  from  the  begining  to  the  end,  either  because  the  govern- 
ment could  not  learn  the  value  of  mounted  troop?,  or  was  incapa? 
ble  of  changing  a  policy  once  adopted,  or  for  some  inexplicable  rea- 
son, the  cavalry  was  underrated  and  neglected.  The  excuse  cannot 
be  offered  that  there  were  not  sufficient  horses  in  the  Confederacy. 
A  glance  at  the  census  of  1860  will  show  one  that  there  were 
horses  enough  in  Texas,  Georgia,  and  North  Carolina  to  have 
mounted  all  the  Confederate  armies  iu  the  field,  leaving  enough  to 
make  the  crops.  And  surely  if  the  government  may  lawfully  "con- 
script" a  man  into  the  army,  it  may  also  conscript  bis  horse,  or 
his  neighbor's  horse.  Almost  at  the  very  time  when  the  General 
of  the  army  of  Tennessee  was  begging  for  horses  to  draw  his  can- 
non, a  Federal  army  was  capturing  nearly  two  thousand  horses 
from  the  farmers  in  the  valley  of  Virginia. 

Nor  can  the  excuse  be  made  that  "the  country  in  which  the  ar- 
mies generally  operated  was  so  densely  wooded,  broken,  and  diffi- 
cult that  cavalry  could  not  be  used  to  advantage" — by  "cavalry" 
meaning  not  Only  those  who  usually  fought  on  horseback,  cavalry 
properly  speaking,  in  the  European  sense,  but  all  mounted  troops, 
as  the  Americans  understand  it.  This  was  not  true  even  in  the 
War  of  the  Revolution,  when  there  were  no  roads  at  all,  and  noth- 
ing but  grass  to  feed  the  horses.  The  little  army  with  which 
Greene  retreated  so  skilfully  before  Cornwallis  along  the  Piedmont 
was  nearly  all  cavalry,  and  Shelby's  "back  mountain  men",  some  of 
them  even  from  Tennessee,  beyond  the  Alleghanies,  with  which  be 
rode  over  the  Blue  Ridge  to  fall  upon  Ferguson  at  King's  Moun- 
tain, were  all  mounted  men,  and  Ferguson's  army  was  captured  to 
the  last  man. 

The  splendid  work  which  Forrest  did  in  the  West  was  sufficient 
to  show  what  might  have  been  done  had  the  cavalry  branch  of  the 
Confederate  service  been  organized.  But  neither  Forrest  nor  his 
services  were  valued  at  their  true  worth.  For  a  time  he  was  even 
removed  from  bis  command,  and  at  all  times  he  was  left  to  shift  for 
himself  to  provide  horses,  arms,  and  equipments  for  his  men. 

If  the  country  was  too  difficult  for  cavalry  operations,  how  came  it 


13 

Why  The  Confederacy  Failed* 

that  the  very  men  whom  Jackson,  in  18G2,  led  victorious  and  tri- 
umphant up  and  down  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah — how  came  it 
that  these  same  men,  in  186  4,  when  once  defeated,  were  to  be  seen 
throwing  away  their  guns  and  haversacks,  and  fleeing  for  their  lives 
to  the  woods  and  the  mountain-?  It  was  not  all  Early's  fault.  It 
was  "Sheridan's  terrible  cavalry"  tbat  did  it,  as  Early  said.  For 
the  Federal  government  bad  at  la«t  learned  what  could  be  done  with 
men  on  horseback.  And  so  Sheridan  was  sent  to  join  Grant,  and 
Appomattox  speedily  followed. 

Who,  then,  can  doubt  tbat  if  Lee  had  been  provided  with  a  re- 
serve of  twenty  thousand  fresh  cavalry,  under  such  a  leader  as  For- 
rest,  at  Gaines's  Mill,  or  the  second  Manassas,  or  Chancellorsville, 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  not  have  survived  to  fight  another 
battk?  For,  unless  Sheridan  be  exceptad,  there  was  no  cavalry 
general  on  either  side  in  the  war  that  could  equal  Forrest  in  the 
pursuit  of  a  defeated  army.  Lord  Wolseley  has  said,  in  bis  sketch 
of  Forrest,  that  ''Forrest's  sixty  mile  pursuit  of  Sturgis  after  their 
battle  was  a  most  remarkable  achievement,  and  well  worth  attention 
by  military  students." 

But  no;  it  was  not  to  be.  Perhaps,  as  has  been  said,  it  was  not 
"intended"  to  be.  A  fatality  seemed  to  attend  the  cause.  At  these 
battles,  yes,  and  at  Shiloh,  at  Chicamauga,  at  Malvern  Hill,  and  at 
Fredericksburg,  which  are  claimed  aa  great  victories  for  the  Confed- 
eracy, what  was  tin  gain?  A  Federal  army  destroyed  or  captured? 
No.  A  hundred  pieces  of  artillery,  with  ammunition  and  equip- 
ments taken?  No.  Then  what?  The  field  of  battle  I  "The  Con- 
federates fought  gloriously,  and  won  the  field  of  battle."  And  that 
was  all  they  ever  won  with  all  their  fighting.  Always  on  the  next 
day,  or  within  a  few  days  afterward,  the  Federal  army  which  they 
had  defeated  so  "gloriously"  was  to  be  found  drawn  up  in  line  of 
battle,  and  all  the  fighting  had  to  be  done  over  again.  And  so  it 
was  even  to  the  end.  The  Confederates  won  many  bloody  fields  of 
battle  thickly  strewn  with  the  bodies  or  their  own  dead  and  wound- 
ed, as  well  as  with  those  of  their  enemies,  but  from  first  to  last  they 
never  gained  a  great  victory,  and  the  reason  was  because  they  were 
weak  in  cavalry. 

But  it  is  asked,  "What  doth  it  profit  u3  to  inquire  into  this? 
Anybody  can  criticize.  Hindsights  are  better  than  foresights.  'Tis 
not  so  easy  to  do  as  to  know  what  had  been  good  to  do.  Wherefore, 
then,  seek  to  know  why  the  Confederacy  failed  ?" 

All  of  which  is  very  true.  The  study  of  the  past  would  be  profit- 
less if  it  were  indulged  in  only  for  the  pleasure  of  finding  fault.  But 
we  must  keep  in  mind  that  it  is  history  only  that  can  furnish  us  a 
guide  to  the  future,  and  tbat  it  i3  only  by  the  study  of  the  mistakes 
and  successes  of  others  who  have  gone  before  us  that  we  can  know 


14 

Wh^  The  @onfe4etactj  Failed, 

how  we  should  act  under  like  circumstances. 

Is  not,  then,  the  first  cause  of  the  failure  of  the  Confederacy 
brought  immediately  home  to  us  when  we  remember  that  the  pro- 
vision of  the  Confederate  constitution  which  made  it  impossible  for 
that  government  to  raise  money  by  taxation  of  property  was  copied 
word  for  word  from  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  under 
which  we  are  living  to  day?  In  case  of  a  war  with  a  great,  first- 
class  naval  power  the  United  States  would  be  just  as  helpless  to 
raise  money  necessary  to  wage  such  a  war,  except  by  issuing  bonds 
and  paper  bills,  as  was  the  Confederacy  when  its  ports  were  block- 
aded from  Norfolk  to  Galveston.  For  it  is  very  certain  that  the 
sinews  of  war  cannot  be  raised  by  a  tax  upon  whiskey,  tobacco,  and 
oleomargarine.  It  is  property  that  must  bear  the  brunt  of  a  great 
war;  and  that  is  the  first  lesson  that  we  may  learn  from  the  failure 
of  the  Confederacy. 

No  doubt  the  United  States  are  strong  enough  to  defend  them- 
selves, even  though  our  generals  should  adopt  a  "policy  of  disper- 
sion", but  surely  we  can  learn  another  lesson  from  the  failure  of 
the  Confederacy. 

The  Confederate  leaders  were  nearly  all  educated  at  West  Point. 
Was  it  not  at  West  Point  that  they  learned  to  depreciate  the  cav- 
alry? Is  it  not  the  tradition,  the  fashion  today,  at  West  Point  to 
underrate  the  cavalry  ?  Are  not  the  "honor  men",  the  distinguish- 
ed men  of  the  classes,  assigned  to  the  engineers  and  the  artillery, 
while  the  dullards  go  to  the  cavalry  ? 

Discussing  the  possibilities  of  a  war  with  England,  and  the 
strength  of  the  United  States  militia  or  national  guard,  some  of  our 
newspapers  lately  boasted  that  an  army  of  a  hundred  thousand  men 
could  be  thrown  into  Canada  within  a  tew  weeks.  If  true,  how 
many  of  them  would  be  mounted  on  horseback  ?  This  a  very  per- 
tinent inquiry,  for  it  requires  from  three  to  six  months'  training  to 
make  a  cavalryman,  and  some  of  the  states  which  furnish  large 
contingents  to  the  national  guard  have  not  a  single  troop  of  horse. 
If  there  is  any  lesson  that  the  failure  of  the  Confederacy  can  teach 
us,  it  is  this:  that  an  invasion  of  Canada — and  I  do  not  mean  that 
such  a  thing  Is,  in  the  least  degree,  probable  or  desirable — made 
without  sufficient  cavalry  would  be  as  barren  of  permanent  results 
as  it  would  be  if  made  with  an  army  of  crosebowmen. 

Duncan  Rose. 


15 

Why  The  $orjfe4eraeij  Failed, 

From  the  Century  Magazine,   Nov.  1896. 

Editorial  Comment. 
CHEAP  MONEY  IN  TWO  WARS- 


In  the  very  striking  paper  which  we  publish  in  this  number  of 
The  Century  on  "Why  the  Confederacy  Failed"  there  is  a  les- 
son in  national  finance  which  is  none  the  lfss  impressive  because  it 
is  so  familiar.  It  is  the  same  lesson  that  bas  been  taught  at  fre- 
quent intervals  during  the  past  four  hundred  years  by  every  nation 
that  has  bad  the  short-sightedness  to  tamper  with  its  standard  of 
value.  "The  Confederate  government",  says  the  waiter,  "was 
smothered  and  strangled  to  death  with  its  owu  irredeemable  paper 
money."  He  does  not  say  that  this  was  the  sole  cause  of  the  failure 
of  the  Southern  rebellion,  but  he  places  it  among  the  three  causes 
which  he  enumerates.  His  argument  in  support  of  his  views  speaks 
for  itself.  There  may  be  a  difference  of  opinion  on  his  second  and 
third  causes,  but  on  his  first  there  is  likely  to  be  none  among  men 
whose  opinion  is  best  worth  having.  No  cause,  however  deserving, 
could  have  succeeded  on  such  a  financial  basis  as  that  on  which  the 
war  of  secession  was  conducted.  The  war  of  the  revolution,  as  Mr. 
Rose  points  out,  would  have  failed  had  not  the  French  and  Dutch 
come  to  the  rescue  of  Washington  and  his  army  with  real  money. 

On  this  point  Washington's  own  words  are  conclusive.  The  cri- 
sis came  in  the  spring  of  1781,  the  seventh  year  of  the  war.  The 
continental  money  had  then  become  so  worthless  as  to  make  useless 
further  employment  of  it  as  a  means  of  defraying  the  expenses  of 
tbe  war.  John  Laurens,  one  of  Washington's  aides-de-camp,  was 
selected  to  go  to  Paris,  to  press  upon  the  French  government  the 
needs  of  the  army,  and  raise  a  new  loan.  Washington  wrote  to  him 
on  the  eve  of  his  departure:  "Be  assured,  my  dear  Laurens,  day 
does  not  follow  night  more  certainly  than  it  brings  with  it  some 
additional  proof  of  the  impracticability  of  carrying  on  the  war  with- 
out the  aids  you  are  directed  to  solicit In  a  word,   we  are  at  the 

end  of  our  tether,  and  now  or  never  our  deliverance  must  come." 
About  this  time  Hamilton  wrote  to  General  Greene  that  public  cred- 
it was  so  totally  lost  that  nobody  would  furnish  aid  even  in  the  face 
of  impending  ruin.  To  the  appeals  of  Laurens  France  responded 
with  a  loan  of  four  millions  of  livres;     the  French   King  granted 


16 

Why  The  ®tmfz&zmcy  Failed, 

six  millions  more  as  a  free  gift,  and  also  guaranteed  in  Holland  a 
loan  of  ten  millions  more,  making  in  all  twenty  million  livres,  or 
about  five  million  dollars.  This  real  money  put  such  new  life  into 
the  American  army  that  Cornwallis  was  forced  to  surrender  a  few 
months  later,  and  independence  was  won. 

It  is  the  opinion  of  most  financial  authorities  that  the  greenbacks, 
instead  of  bt-ing  a  help  to  the  North  during  the  war  of  the  rebellion, 
were  a  hindrance,  and  that  we  won  in  spite  of  them  rather  than  be- 
cause of  tnem.  Certain  it  is  that  they  added  enormously  to  the  cost 
of  the  war.  Mr.  Henry  C.  Adams,  in  his  work  on  "Public  Debts", 
shows  that  the  war  cost  us  over  $800,000,000  more  than  it 
would  had  we  n.ot  issued  greenbacks  and  thus  gone  of?  the  gold 
standard.  If  the  government  had  relied  on  increased  taxation  for 
funds  to  prosecute  the  war,  it  would  have  remained  on  the  gold  ba- 
sis, and  would  have  bought  all  its  supplies  on  the  same  basis.  At 
the  same  time  it  would  have  maintained  its  credit  unimpaired, 
and  would  have  been  able  to  borrow  all  the  additional  money  it 
needed,  at  much  better  rates  than  it  actually  paid.  As  it  was  it 
paid  an  average  premium  of  fifty  per  cent  on  all  its  purchases  for 
three  years  and  a  halt.  rlhe  total  expenditure  of  the  four  years  of 
the  war  was  over  three  billion,  three  hundred  and  fifty  million  dol- 
lars, of  which  Mr.  Adams  estimates  that  two  and  one  half  billion 
dollars  consisted  of  purchases  in  the  open  market,  where  the  green- 
back dollar  bought  only  sixty- six  cents  worth  of  goods.  In  other 
words,  we  spent  two  and  a  half  billion  dollars,  and  got  in  return  on- 
ly one  billion,  six  hundred  and  thirty  million  dollars  worth  of  pro- 
perty. The  difference,  eight  hundred  and  seventy  million  dollars, 
was  the  unnecessary  cost  to  the  taxpayers  which  the  greenback 
entailed 


17 

Wh#  The  BtxnfQ&Mixcy  Failed. 

From  the  Century  Magazine,   Feb.  1897. 

OPINIONS  OF  GENERALS  S.  D.  LEE,  JOS.  WHEELER, 

E.  P.  ALEXANDER,  E.  M.  LAW,   DON  CARLOS  BUELL, 

O.  0.  HOWARD,     AND   JACOB.  D.  COX. 

The  communications  which  follow  from  distinguished  general 
officers  who  were  engaged  in  the  War  of  Secession  have  been 
received  in  reply  to  our  request  for  frank  comment  upon  the 
points  raised  in  the  article  in  The  Century  for  November,  en- 
titled "Why  the  Confederacy  Failed",  written  by  Mr. 
Duncan  Rose,  — Editor  Century. 

FROM    8TEPHEN   D.    LEE,     LIEUTENANT-GENERAL,    C.    S.    A. 

I  am  asked  to  give  my  frank  opinion  of  the  correctness  of  Mr. 
Rose's  article.  The  writer  gives  three  main  causes  ot  failure: 
"1.  The  excessive  issue  of  paper  money,  2.  the  policy  of  dispersion, 
3.  the  neglect  of  the  cavalry",  and  remarks  "The  'sinews  of  war' 
mean  specie,  and  nothing  but  specie". 

History  tells  us  that  nearly  all  great  wars  have  been  waged  on 
currency  that  greatly  depreciated  in  value,  aud  yet  with  peace  and 
success  came  full  restoration  of  credit.  This  has  been  the  case  with 
England,  France,  Germany,  and  Russia.  Finances  always  go 
wrong  in  failures.  la  our  Revolution  success  could  not  even  rescue 
the  worthless  money  of  our  fathers  from  repudiation  and  oblivion. 
Alexander  H.  Stevens  says  that  in  the  great  war  between  the  States 
"both  sides  relied  for  the  means  of  support  upon  issues  of  paper 
money  and  upon  loans  secured  by  bonds."  Nearly  all  currency  is- 
sued by  countries  in  great  wars  is  to  a  certain  extent  "fiat  money" 
and  depends  for  its  redemption  mainly  upon  the  success  of  the  issu- 
ing country.  Federal  greenbacks  had  only  the  faith  of  the  govern- 
ment behind  them,  while  the  bills  and  bonds  of  the  Confederacy 
had  enormous  quantities  of  cotton  and  tobacco,  received  as  tithes 
and  purchased  with  bonds,  that  were  assets  against  its  liabilities. 
Had  the  Confederacy  succeeded,  its  ability  to  meet  its  obligations 
would  have  been  recognized  by  financiers. 

Mr.  Rose  says  that  the  Confederacy  provided  little  for  taxation, 
and  during  the  war  "there  was  raised  by  taxation  only  the  sum  of 
$48,000,000,  and  that  all  paper  money."  Certainly  the  people  of 
the  Confederacy  were  taxed  when  they  gave  their  specie  [all  they 


18 

Wh#  The  BbnfG&et&cy  Failed. 

bad]  for  bonds,  and  by  law  one  tentb  of  all  their  crops  and  of  all 
the  proceeds  of  their  labor  in  every  industry.  This  latter  was  better 
than  money.  It  was  a  tithe,  which,  although  money  fluctuated, 
did  not  fluctuate,  but  furnished  food,  cotton,  tobacco,  clothing, 
and  supplies  generally  in  kind,  and  was  pretty  abundant  even  to  the 
close  of  the  war  in  the  limited  area  not  occupied  by  hostile  armies. 
The  trouble  was  that  the  few  lines  of  railroad  were  in  a  worn-out 
condition,  and  were  overtaxed  by  transportation.  I  do  not  think 
the  statement  as  to  the  first  main  cause  is  sustained. 

I  shall  treat  the  second  and  third  main  causes  together.  Strateg- 
ically, the  Confederacy  was  virtually  exposed  to  combined  land  and 
naval  attack.  *No  country  could  have  been  more  fully  exposed  tc 
perfectly  crushing  blows,  both  on  its  land  and  water  sides."  This 
exposure  was  caused  by  the  Mississippi  River  cutting  it  in  twain, 
thus  enabling  the  great  fleets  of  Karragut  from  the  ocean,  and  Foote 
from  the  North,  to  give  valuable  aid  to  Grant  and  Sherman,  virtu- 
ally  cutting  of?  Texas,  Arkansas,  and  most  of  Louisiana,  even  be- 
fore the  fall  of  Vicksburg,  July  4,  1868;  and  by  the  Cumberland 
and  Tennessee  rivers,  each  reaching  from  the  Ohio  River  with  a 
deep  southward  bend  into  the  very  heart  of  the  country,  enabling 
the  fleets  to  transport  Grant's  army  to  Fort  Henry,  and  be  his 
flank  at  Donelson.  The  control  of  these  rivers,  and  others  frcm 
Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts,  was  of  vital  moment,  and  neither  men  nor 
means  should  have  been  spared  to  maintain  control  of  these  water 
highways.     Certainly  to  do  so  was  not  dispersion. 

The  Confederacy  had  no  navy  worth  mentioning,  and  when  it 
lost  control  of  these  rivers  it  lost  Texas,  Arkansas,  most  of  Louisi- 
ana, and  most  of  Tennessee,  for  troops  from  the  trans-Mississippi 
refused  to  cross  the  river  after  1862;  nor  had  it  vessels  to  protect 
the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts,  or  to  prevent  blockade.  The  Confed- 
eracy for  the  last  two  years,  and  on  the  territory  where  the  issue 
was  decided,  was  composed  of  the  States  of  Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
South  Carolina,  Florida,  Georgia,  Alabama  and  Mississippi — seven 
States — and  was  a  narrow  strip  from  the  Potomac  to  the  Mississip- 
pi River,  open  to  combined  land  and  naval  attack  along  its  entire 
fronts — north,  south,  east,  and  west.  There  were  really  only  two 
main  armies — Lee's  in  Virginia,  and  Johnston's  in  Georgia.  The 
Mississippi  army  had  been  merged  in  the  Army  of  Tennessee.  This 
does  not  appear  to  be  dispersion. 

Dispersion,  mainly  in  cavalry,  was  a  political  necessity.  The 
battle  of  States'  rights  and  local  self-government  was  being  fought. 
The  States  that  furnished  troops  and  supplies  demanded  protection 
from  invasion,  desolation,  and  pillage;  and  this  was  reasonable  when 
we  consider  the  character  of  the  war  as  shown  by  Sherman's  raid 
in   Mississippi  and  through  Georgia,  and  Sheridan's  campaign  in 


19 

Wh#  Th&  Ganfe&ex&cy  Failed, 

the  ^ciieyandin  other  places,  the  official  letters  and  reports  of 
these  officers,  and  their  spirit,  not  representing  one  half  of  the  real 
character  of  their  work.  Why  send  troops  to  help  Virginia  and 
George,  and  leave  other  States  to  desolation  and  pillage  ?  Cer- 
tainly this  question  is  pertinent  when  we  consider  how  the  country 
was  laid  waste. 

The  cavalry,  when  not  with  the  two  great  armies,  was  protecting 
vast  granaries  needed  to  feed  troops,  and  defending  arsenals  and 
depots  which  in  the  narrow  belt  were  open  to  attack  and  destruction 
everywhere,  owing  to  tbe  great  odds,  and  the  fleets  holding  the 
ocean,  gulf,  and  rivers.  The  charge  of  dispersion  does  not  hold  good. 

The  writer  speaks  of  cavalry  as  it  existed  in  the  days  of  Napo- 
leon and  the  Revolution.  Times  had  greatly  changed.  Tbe  rifled 
cannon  and  the  Springfield  and  repeating  rifles,  arms  of  precision 
wiih  long  range,  had  relegated  to  the  past  the  dashing  cavalry 
charge  against  infantry  or  artillery  supported  by  infantry.  Such 
handling  of  cavalry  then  would  have  been  slaughter  and  death  to 
man  and  horse.  Any  Fplendid  brigade  of  infantry  in  either  array 
felt  secure  against  tbe  attack  of  charging  cavalry.  Besides  our 
country  was  more  wooded  than  Europe.  No  general  could  watch 
and  plan  on  his  tower  as  Napoleon  did.  What  could  cavalry  do  in 
charges  on  the  battlefield  of  the  Wilderness,  or  at  Chicamauga, 
where  the  fields  were  mere  patches  ?  Cavalry  was  nothing  more 
than  mounted  infantry,  and  fought  on  foot  even  in  most  cases  a- 
gainst  cavalry.  This  arm  played  as  important  a  part  as  it  ever  did 
in  war.  It  covered  the  front,  rear,  and  flanks  of  armies.  By  celer- 
ity of  movement  it  met  and  overcame  or  checked  isolated  columns  of 
troops.  It  played  on  lines  of  transportation;  it  overlapped  armies 
in  battle,  and  destroyed  their  trains;  and  in  great  battles  even  mov- 
edup  along  with  infantry.  It  protected  extended  territory  when  oth- 
troops  were  concentrated  in  tbe  great  armies.  No  class  of  troops 
was  mere  ably  commanded  or  did  better  service  in  either  army. 
The  Confederate  cavalry  was  well  mounted  till  near  the  close  of  the 
war.  They  conld  not  take  all  the  horses  from  a  people  who  had 
made  so  many  sacrifices,  as  the  Federals  did  from  the  people  of  the 
South.  [See  Sherman's  report  of  his  march  to  the  sea.]  The  cav- 
alry was  as  well  equipped  and  armed  as  the  circumstances  permitted. 

I  am  one  of  those  who,  like  my  great  namesake,  said:  "I  will  not 
speculate  on  the  causes  of  the  failure,  as  I  have  seen  abundant  cau- 
ses for  it  in  the  tremendous  odds  brought  against  us";  "the  South 
was  overpowered  by  the  superior  numbers  and  resources  of  tbe 
North".  If  we  conpare  the  two  parts  of  the  country,  we  find  the 
North  outnumbering  the  South  four  to  one  in  arms-bearing  popula- 
tion, incomparably  better  prepared  for  war,  having  an  organized 
government,  an  organized  army  and  navy,  with   arsenals,   dock. 


20 

Why  The  ®&nfe&&tnc#  Failed* 

yards,  and  machine-shops,  and  having  free  intercourse  with  the 
world  from  which  to  get  supplies  and  men;  while  every  port  was 
sealed  against  help  from  the  outside  world  to  the  Confederacy, 
which  had  to  organize  its  government,  and  improvise  everything  for 
the  unequal  struggle  from  an  agricultural  population. 

The  official  records  show  that  the  North  had  two  million,  six 
hundred  thousand  men  from  first  to  last;  after  October,  1861,  nev- 
er less  than  eight  hundred  thousand,  and  often  exceeding  one  mil. 
lion  men.  One  million  and  fifty  thousand  men  in  round  numbers 
were  mustered  out  at  the  close  of  the  war. 

The  Confederates,  who,  by  the  most  reliable  records  and  author- 
ity, had  six  hundred  thousand  from  first  to  last,  surrendered  one 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men.  The  effective  force  in  the  field 
never  exceeded  two  hundred  thousand  men  at  any  one  time.  This 
army  came  mainly  from  the  eleven  seceding  States,  having  a  popula- 
tion of  six  million  whites  [three  million  males].  It  was  about  all 
that  the  population  could  do  in  soldiers.  "The  Union  armies  out- 
numbered those  of  the  Confederacy  in  all  cases  as  two,  commonly 
as  three,  and  during  the  entire  time  in  which  Grant  was  in  com- 
mand as  four,  to  one".  When  we  consider  that  in  nearly  all  im- 
portant battles  the  forces  did  not  differ  very  much,  the  charge  of 
dispersion  might  be  lodged  against  the  Union  commanders  rather 
than  against  the  Confederate,  and,  considering  the  relative  odds  in 
enlistments,  does  not  indicate  dispersion  on  the  part  of  the  Confede- 
rates. 

In  addition  to  the  land  forces,  the  navy  of  the  United  States  con- 
sisted of  seven  hundred  vessels  of  war,  manned  by  105,000  sailors, 
with  a  fleet  of  transports,  steamers,  barges,  and  coal-floats  almost 
innumerable,  which  in  1862,  on  the  Mississippi  River  and  its  tribu- 
taries, alone  numbered  over  2200  vessels — a  great  help  to  General 
Grant  and  other  generals  in  operating  against  Vicksburg  and  Port 
Hudson. 

It  was  not  known  what  was  the  number  of  vessels  chartered  on 
the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts  in  moving  the  large  armies  to  Port 
Royal,  the  North  Carolina  coast,  Florida  Mobile,  and  Louisiana. 
The  navy  in  its  help  was  as  decisive  in  results  as  the  great  armies 
in  the  field.  Without  its  aid  the  armies  of  the  Union  might  not 
have  been  successful.  It  blockaded  the  coast  from  the  Potomac  to 
the  Rio  Grande.  It  cut  up  the  Confederacy  by  her  rivers,  in  occu- 
pying these  with  gunboats;  in  establishing  many  depots  and  points 
of  departure  from  the  line  of  coasts  and  from  the  river  banks,  for 
armies  to  invade,  overrun,  and  destroy  supplies  in  new  territory; 
in  transporting  armies  around  territory  they  could  not  cross;  and 
in  saving  armies  when  defeated.  Coupled  with  the  navy,  I  men- 
tion the  great  trunk  railways  converging  in  and  skirting   Confede- 


21 

Whg  The  Gxmfederacg  Failed, 

rate  territory,  connecting  with  powerful  States  fall  of  supplies  to 
support  armies,  and  able  to  transport  them  in  any  emergency  to  any 
point. 

I  feel  that  General  Lee's  quotation  is  a  good  one,  and  none  other 
need  be  sought  as  a  cause  of  failure. 

S.  D.  Lee. 

BT    JOSEPH  WHEELER,    LIEUTENANT  GENERAL    C,    S.    A.. 

History  will  attribute  the  failure  of  the  Confederate  cause  to  the 
great  preponderance  of  men  and  resources  with  which  it  was  con- 
fronted. 

In  commenting  upon  Mr.  Rose's  article,  I  would  say: 

1.  That  the  financial  system  might  have  been  better  no  one  will 
deny;  but  when  we  consider  that  a  new-born  nation  equipped,  fur- 
nished with  ammunition,  fed,  clothed,  and  paid  an  army  which  for 
four  years  engaged  a  force  600,000  strong,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
there  was  much  in  our  financial  management  to  commend. 

2.  I  think  the  author  goes  to  extremes  in  condemning  the  mili- 
tary policy  which  he  terms  one  of  dispersion. 

The  force  with  which  we  defended  Charleston  was  less  by  far 
than  that  with  which  it  was  attacked.  The  surrender  of  13,000 
men  at  Fort  Donelson  was  unnecessary.  It  was  quite  possible  to 
have  withdrawn  the  army  after  it  had  become  apparent  that  the  po- 
sition was  untenable.  And  it  is  certain  that  we  should  never  have 
allowed  30,000  men  to  become  penned  up  at  Vicksburg.  But  these 
disasters  cannot  properly  be  attributed  to  the  policy  which  Mr. 
Rose  condemns. 

The  author  is  mistaken  in  the  assertion  that  "if  every  city  upon 
the  seaboard  had  been  evacuated  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  the 
Confederates  would  have  been  the  stronger".  He  is  also  mistaken 
in  his  suggestion  that  we  "should  have  learned  a  lesson  from  the 
war  of  the  Revolution,  whose  capital  was  changed  nine  times,  and 
the  British  allowed  to  march  from  one  end  of  the  thirteen  colonies 
to  the  other".  In  that  war,  and  in  Frederick's  Seven  Years'  War 
to  which  he  also  refers,  the  conditions  were  very  different  frcm 
those  in  our  conflict.  We  were  more  dependent  upon  arsenals  and 
depots  and  lines  of  communication,  and  we  had  political  as  well  as 
military  conditions  to  consider.  The  breaking  of  our  railroads  by 
which  supplies  were  carried  from  our  Southern  granaries  wouid 
have  made  it  impossible  for  us  to  hold  Richmond,  and  the  retreat  ot 
Lee's  army  into  the  Carolines  or  Georgia  would  have  been  the  be- 
ginning of  the  end. 


22 

Why  Th£  G&nfe&M&cy  Failed. 

3.  The  tendency  in  European  armies  during  the  last  thirty  years 
has  been  to  increase  the  cavalry  as  compared  with  the  other  arms, 
and  it  is  true  that  a  large  proportion  of  cavalry  generally  adds  to 
the  efficiency  and  power  of  an  army.  Especially  would  this  apply 
to  a  country  like  the  South,  where  so  many  were  trained  horsemen; 
nevertheless,  after  careful  consideration,  the  policy  adopted  by  the 
Confederate  army  commanders  was  to  encourage  an  increase  of 
their  infantry,  and  to  discourage  and  even  prohibit  enlistments  in 
the  cavalry.  In  European  wars  it  often  occurred  that  the  weaker 
of  two  contending  armies  became  disordered,  and  in  this  condition  a 
charge  by  a  large  body  of  cavalry  completed  the  discomfiture;  but, 
with  rare  exceptions,  matters  were  very  different  during  the  Civil 
War. 

The  first  battle  of  Manassas  and  the  battle  of  Shiloh  might,  how- 
ever, be  well  cited  to  sustain  the  position  taken  by  Mr.  Rose.  An 
organized  cavalry  force  under  a  good  commander  at  Manassas  could 
have  overtaken  and  captured  much  of  McDowell's  army  in  its  re- 
treat to  Washington,  and  such  a  force  at  Shiloh  could  have  inter- 
cepted  much  of  Grant's  army  in  its  retreat  to  the  Tennessee  River; 
but  after  this  the  improved  organization,  discipline,  and  equipment 
of  the  Federal  army,  together  with  its  numerical  preponderance, 
gave  it  such  strength  that  very  few  opportunities  were  offered  for 
cavalry  to  charge  upon  a  fljing  foe.  At  Perryville  the  Federal 
corps  and  divisions  which  became  seriously  engaged  were  defeated 
and  driven  in  disorder,  but  night  came  on  and  ended  the  conflict. 
Our  cavalry  was  occupied  with  large  forces  which  extended  beyond 
our  flanks,  and  it  charged  upon  them  and  captured  many  prisoners; 
but  the  complete  rout  of  70,000  men  under  Buell  by  less  than  one 
third  of  that  number  was  not  possible.  When  Murfreesboro'  wa3 
fought,  the  cavalry  division  of  Forrest  was  in  western  Tennessee, 
and  that  of  Morgan  in  Kentucky.  The  remaining  cavalry  did  val- 
iant service,  going  around  the  Federal  rear,  and  charging  with 
good  effect  upon  the  disordered  Federal  right.  At  Chicamauga  our 
cavalry  pursued  and  captured  a  number  of  the  retreating  enemy, 
but  darkness  and  barricades  stopped  their  advance,  and  the  next 
day  Rosecrans'  army  was  behind  breastworks  and  fortifications  in- 
vulnerable to  attacks  from  cavalry.  During  the  last  year  or  eigh- 
teen months  of  the  war  we  did  not  have  an  army  strong  enough  to 
defeat  and  disperse  the  army  by  which  it  was  opposed,  and  chances 
for  cavalry  to  pursue  and  complete  their  discomfiture  did  not  arise. 

In  General  Sherman's  campaign  in  1864,  his  force  was  more 
than  double  that  cmmanded  by  General  Johnston.  Sherman's  ar- 
my was  thoroughly  organizrd,  well  equipped,  well  officered  and  dis- 
ciplined. It  is  true  that  on  many  occasions  we  gained  a  decided 
\ictcry   at   the  point  of  attack,  and  in  July  1864  the  Confederate 


23 

Wh#  The  Btxtitetetficy  Failed* 

cavalry  defeated  and  dispersed  10,000  cavalry  under  Stoneman, 
Garrard,  and  McCook;  but  these  Confederate  successes  in  no  wise 
disordered  the  Federal  troops  which  did  not  engage  us,  and  there 
was  very  seldom  any  flying  foe  for  such  cavalry  operations  as  are 
referred  to  by  Mr.  Rose. 

The  important  service  performed  by  this  arm  was  to  fight  dis- 
mounted as  infantry,  keep  close  up  to  the  enemy,  keep  informed  of 
their  movements,  cover  our  flanks  and  prevent  their  being  turned, 
and  frequently  to  raid  upon  the  enemy's  communications.  Its  bus- 
iness was  also  to  fight  the  numerous  cavalry  of  the  opposing  army. 
With  rare  exceptions,  all  these  duties  were  well  performed. 

What  has  been  said  in  regard  to  the  opposing  armies  of  Sherman 
and  Johnston  also  applies  to  the  armies  under  Grant  and  Lee.  No 
one  will  controvert  the  fact  that  an  increased  cavalry  force  would 
have  been  of  great  service  to  the  Confederacy;  but  if  that  increase 
had  been  obtained  by  taking  from  the  infantry,  it  can  hardly  be 
contended  that  it  would  have  added  to  our  strength.  Every  thought- 
ful man  will  admit  that  the  life  of  the  Confederate  government  de- 
pended upon  our  maintaining  the  army  under  Lee  in  Virginia, 
and  the  Army  of  the  West,  commanded  at  different  times  by  the 
Johnstons,  Beauregard,  Bragg,  and  Hood.  It  was  evident  during 
the  entire  conflict  that  so  long  as  these  armies  were  sustained  with- 
out serious  disaster  the  Confederacy  would  live;  but  that  if  either 
was  disabled  by  defeat  in  battle,  or  by  loss  of  resources,  so  as  to  be 
unable  to  present  a  firm  front  to  the  opposing  army,  the  almost  im- 
mediate fall  of  the  government  would  be  the  inevitable  result. 

Joseph  Wheeler. 

BY  E.  P    ALEXANDER,  BRIGADIER  GENERAL  OF  ARTILLERY  C.  S.  A. 

I  concur  in  Mr.  Rose's  belief  that  the  success  of  the  Confederacy 
was,  for  a  time,  not  impossible;  but  I  think  it  is  as  difficult  to  assign 
brief  and  general  reasons  for  its  failure  as  it  would  be  to  say  why  A 
has  beaten  B  in  a  long  and  closely  contested  game  of  chess.  Prob- 
ably during  forty  moves  B  might  have  won  by  different  play,  and 
each  move  of  the  forty  might  be  called  the  fatal  one.  But  I  do  not 
think  at  all  that  Mr.  Rose  has  made  out  his  case  for  any  one  of  the 
three  moves,  or  causes  which  he  assigns. 

Without  discussing  how  or  whether  the  issue  of  Confederate  cur- 
rency could  have  been  avoided,  it  is  enough  to  say  that  it  answered 
its  purpose;  and  the  credit  of  the  Confederacy  was  good  enough, 
both  at  home  and  abroad,  when  its  last  chance  in  the  field  was  gone. 
This  date,  I  think,  can  be  exactly  fixed  as  June  15,  1864,  the  rea- 
sons therefor  being  another  story.    Up  to  that  date  the  Confederacy 


24 

Whtj  The  Sonfederaetj  Failed. 

could  buy  anything  in  the  world,  from  an  ironclad  in  France  to  a 
horseshoe  in  Richmond.  The  trouble  lay  in  blockades  and  other  ob- 
stacles to  getting  needed  articles  from  places  where  they  could  be  pro- 
cured to  places  where  they  were  needed.  Times  were  often  raid  in  the 
field  and  camp,  but  this  cut  little  figure  when  the  trial  of  battle  was 
on,  and  we  never  lost  a  field  that  I  know  of  for  lack  of  food,  ammu- 
nition, clothes,  or  anything  that  money  might  have  bought.  Mr. 
Rose's  deduc:ions  as  to  the  principles  of  national  taxation  are 
sound  enough,  and  there  are  inde»d  mary  other  \aluable  lessons  to 
be  learned  from  the  history  of  Confederate  monej,  some  of  them 
apropos,  too,  to  the  present  time;  but  it  is  not  fair  to  hold  its  issue 
responsible  for  the  loss  of  any  battle  having  any  irfluence  upon  the 
final  result. 

2.  I  cannot  agree  at  all  with  Mr.  Rose's  statement  that  the  Con- 
federate government  attempted  to  hold  unnecessary  frontier.  It 
was  bound  to  hold  large  and  undisturbed  agricultural  districts  in 
order  to  raise  food  for  its  armies  and  it  was  bound  to  guard,  even 
against  bridge  •  burning  raids,  the  leng  railroad  arteries  which 
brought  up  supplies  to  the  armies;  and  it  was  bound  to  maintain 
somewhere  very  large  arsenals  and  machine  shops  and  warehouses, 
and  to  protect  them  when  once  located.  Richmond,  for  instance, 
was  defended  to  the  death,  not  for  its  being  the  capital,  but  for  con- 
taining the  Tredegar  Ironworks,  without  which,  it  has  been  said, 
our  armies  could  not  have  kept  in  the  field  two  years.  The  capital 
could  be  moved,  but  the  ironworks  could  not.  These  necessities 
seem  to  me  to  justify  the  defense  of  every  foot  of  territory  which 
was  held  after  the  war  was  once  fairly  joined.  But  had  all  the  Con- 
federate armies  been  concentrated,  as  Mr.  Rose  suggests,  on  the 
flanks  of  the  Appalachians,  or  anywhere  else,  abandoning  their  arse- 
nals and  sources  of  supply,  they  would  soon  have  been  out  of  am- 
munition, and  would  have  been  starved  into  surrender. 

Had  Mr.  Rose,  however,  criticized  the  neglect  of  the  Confederate 
government  to  utilize  the  advantage  it  possessed  in  having  what  is 
technically  called  "the  interior  lines"  by  transferring  heavy  rein- 
forcements rapidly  back  and  forth  between  the  East  and  West,  he 
would  have  made  the  most  severe  criticism  which  I  think  can  be 
justly  made  upon  Confederate  strategy.  This  was  attempted  only 
once — in  September  1863 — and  then,  though  under  difficulties  pre- 
venting attainment  of  the  best  results,  Chicamauga  was  made  a  sort 
of  victory,  instead  of  a  disastrous  defeat. 

The  greatest  opportunity  ever  offered  for  such  strategy  was  prob- 
ably in  May  1863,  after  Hooker's  defeat  at  Chancellorsville.  It 
was  discussed  at  that  timp,  but  not  adopted.  Vigorously  executed, 
it  might  have  forestalled  both  the  Vicksburg  and  the  Gettysburg 
campaigns. 


25 

Why  The  GbnUtemcy  Failed. 

3.  As  to  the  alleged  "neglect  of  cavalry",  Mr.  Rose  greatly  under- 
estimates the  difficulty  of  supplying  horses,  and  he  entirely  ignores 
that  of  getting  men.  Men  couM  have  been  had  only  by  diminish- 
ing the  number  of  our  infantry  man  for  man.  Considering  our  in- 
feriority in  numbers,  and  the  topography  of  our  average  battlefields, 
I  think  no  competent  military  critic  would  have  advised  in  any  of 
our  armies  exchanging  any  material  number  of  our  infantry  for  cav- 
alry. Indeed,  the  general  tendency,  as  the  war  went  on,  was  to 
convert  our  cavalry  into  mounted  infantry.  For  the  day  of  decis- 
ive cavalry  charges  passed  away  with  the  advent  of  long  range 
small  arms,  breech  loaders,  and  improved  artillery.  Even  at  Wa- 
terloo, had  half  or  more  of  Napoleon's  cavalry  been  infantry  or  ar- 
tillery, his  chances  would  have  been  improved;  for  their  first  charge 
left  a  rampart  of  dead  horses  which  broke  up  all  renewed  efforts. 
We  may  see  in  future  armies  large  developments  of  mounted  infan- 
try, possibly  two  men  to  a  horse  sometimes,  but  cavalry,  in  the  old 
sense  of  the  term,  will  cut  little  figure  in  the  future. 

It  is  surely  very  shallow  to  charge  West  Point  with  depreciation 
of  the  cavalry  because  officers  selected  for  branches  of  the  service 
requiring  the  most  skilled  application  of  higher  mathematics  are 
chosen  from  among  those  who,  other  things  being  equal,  are  most 
proficient  in  mathematics.  Any  other  principle  of  selection  would 
be  absurd. 

Most  of  Mr.  Rose's  arguments  and  illustrations  are  drawn  from 
events  that  happened  on  a  different  planet  from  the  one  now  occu- 
pying our  orbit.  The  old  one,  on  which  Numidians,  Macedonians, 
Napoleon,  Frederick,  George  III,  and  our  forefathers  adjusted  their 
various  difficulties,  was  not  fitted  up  either  by  land  or  by  sea  with 
steam  and  electrical  appliances.  Virtually  the  only  way  to  go  any- 
where in  force  was  to  walk  on  land  or  to  take  small  and  inferior 
sailing-craft  by  sea.  Consequently  there  were  many  cases  where 
small  nations  got  the  better  of  large  ones  because  the  big  fellow 
could  not  get  at  the  little  one.  But  in  our  case  the  big  fellow  was  all 
about  the  little  one  from  the  very  start,  leaving  him  no  resources 
but  Providence  and  his  own  pluck.  Which  failed  him,  it  would  be 
invidious  to  inquire. 

E.  P.  Alexander. 

BT   E.    M.    LAW,    MAJOR  GENERAL,    C.    S.    A. 

I  am  loath  to  criticize  so  thoughtful  and  interesting  a  paper  as 
that  of  Mr.  Duncan  Rose  in  the  November  number  of  the  centu- 
ry on  the  question  "Why  the  Confederacy  Failed",  especially  as  it 
opens  a  field  of  investigation  the  cultivation  of  which  may  bring  to 


26 

Why  The  Gxmfederaetj  Failed, 

light  much  interesting  and  as  yet  unwritten  history.  But  I  cannot 
entirely  agree  with  his  conclusion  that  "in  a  war  for  independence 
numbers  do  not  count".  The  history  of  Poland  and  tbat  of  Hunga- 
ry are  conspicuous  refutations  of  the  statement.  "The  little  republic 
of  Switzerland"  which  he  cites,  "won  its  independence"  by  reason 
of  the  very  fact  that  the  kingdoms  and  empires  by  which  she  was 
surrounded  were  "in  arms"  as  often  against  one  another  as  against 
her,  as  well  as  because  of  the  impregnability  of  her  mountain  fast- 
nesses when  properly  defended.  If  we  are  to  credit  history,  Fred- 
erick tha  Great  was  "at  the  last  gasp"  during  the  Seven  Years'  War 
and  Prussia  would  probably  have  shared  the  fate  which  overtook 
Poland  a  few  years  later  had  not  the  opportune  death  of  the  Em- 
press Elizabeth  and  the  accession  of  Peter  III  converted  Russia, 
his  most  powerful  foe,  into  a  friend  and  ally.  And,  however  much 
national  pride  may  rebel  at  the  admission,  the  unbiassed  student  of 
our  own  Revolutionary  history  must  confess  that  the  American 
cause  was  well-nigh  hopeless  when  the  powerful  intervention  of 
France,  and  the  complications  of  England  with  Spain  and  Holland, 
turned  the  scale  in  our  favor.  Besides  the  moral  effect  of  the  re- 
cognition of  our  independence,  the  fleets  of  France  broke  the  strict 
blockade  of  the  American  Ports,  and  provided  the  colonies  with  eup- 
plies  which  were  of  far  more  value  to  them  than  the  few  troops  fur- 
nished by  their  ally.  Had  a  like  good  fortune  attended  the  Confed- 
rate  States,  had  some  friendly  nation  powerful  enough  to  enfoice  its 
decrees  recognized  their  independence  and  opened  their  ports,  their 
subjugation  would  have  been  impossible,  even  if  we  admit  the  full 
force  of  all  the  reasons  assigned  for  failure. 

Our  ports  being  closed,  however,  and  the  Confederacy  being  de- 
pendent entirely  upon  its  internal  resources  and  credit,  Mr.  Rose's 
criticism  of  its  financial  system  is  unanswerable.  The  free  use  of 
the  taxing  power,  to  which  as  a  war  measure  the  pec  pie  would  have 
submitted  as  patiently  as  they  did  to  the  conscription,  was  all  that 
could  have  saved  its  finances  from  the  ruin  tbat  speedily  overtook 
them  through  the  continued  issue  of  irredeemable  paper  money. 

"The  policy  of  dispersion",  which  Mr.  Rose  assigns  as  another 
cause  of  failure,  was  from  a  military  point  of  view  the  gravest  mis- 
take that  could  have  been  made.  It  prolonged  the  struggle,  no 
doubt,  but  continued  adherence  to  it  under  the  conditions  tbat  exist- 
ed meant  certain  failure  in  the  end.  Some  Confederate  officers,  no- 
tably  General  Joseph  E  Johnston,  realized  this  early  in  the  war; 
but  their  views  were  overruled  by  the  Richmond  government,  which 
seemed  to  dread  nothing  so  much  as  a  loss  of  territory,  and  adhered 
to  the  end,  with  fatal  pertinacity,  to  the  policy  of  holding  positions 
the  defense  of  which  could  result  only  in  disaster  to  the  defenders. 
Whether  the  Confederate  cause  would  have  been  won  by  pursuing 


27 

Whg  The  Gonfederactj  Failed* 

an  opposite  course  we  cannot  know;  but  a  policy  of  concentration 
and  bard  blows,  with  the  decisive  results  that  must  have  followed, 
would  at  least  have  had  the  merit  of  deciding  the  struggle  quickly, 
and  saving  the  country  the  prolonged  agony  and  wasting  effects  of 
a  four  years'  war. 

For  the  third  cause  of  failure  assigned  by  Mr.  Rose,  namely,  "the 
neglect  of  the  cavalry",  I  would  substitute  "the  dispersion  of  the 
cavalry."  I  think  the  records  will  show  that  the  Confederacy  had 
cavalry  enough  in  proportion  to  the  other  arms  of  the  service,  and 
of  a  quality  superior,  man  for  man,  to  their  antagonists.  Had  it 
been  concentrated  in  large  bodies  in  the  vicinity  of  our  great  armies 
under  such  leaders  as  Stuart,  Forrest,  Van  Dorn,  and  Hampton,  in- 
stead of  being  scattered  by  companies,  regiments,  and  brigades  all 
over  the  country,  the  many  great  victories  won  by  those  armies 
might  have  been  as  fruitful  as  they  were  in  fact  barren  of  results. 

The  causes  that  contributed  to  Confederate  failure  were  many, 
but  among  them  all  none  can  be  compared  in  potency  and  far-reach- 
ing influence  to  the  failure  to  provide  an  adequate  navy  as  well  as 
an  army;  and  that  far  sighted  statemanship  in  the  beginning  of  the 
struggle  could  have  done  this  there  is  little  doubt.  With  open  ports, 
foreign  trade  would  have  given  the  Confederate  finances  impregna- 
ble strength,  the  armies  would  not  have  suffered  the  deprivation  of 
many  things  necessary  to  the  efficiency  of  soldiers  in  the  field,  and 
the  rivers  of  the  South  would  not  have  been  free  waterways  for 
Federal  gunboats.  But  despite  all  the  errors  of  statemanship,  finan- 
ciering, and  generalship,  in  spite  of  resources  rendered  unavailable 
by  reason  of  blockaded  ports,  and  in  the  face  of  greatly  superior 
numbers,  the  valor  and  devotion  of  the  Confederate  soldier  came 
"perilously  near"  winning  the  fight.  On  two  occasions,  at  least,  the 
cause  was  well-nigh  won,  but  lost  again  in  such  a  way  as  almost  to 
compel  belief  in  the  direct  interposition  of  Providence. 

E.  M.  Law. 

BY  DON  CAELOS  BCELL,  MAJOR  GENERAL,  U.  S.  A. 

Why  did  the  Confederacy  fail  ?  The  comprehensive  answer  is  that 
it  failed  for  lack  of  ability  to  succeed.  To  say  that  the  effort  was  one 
of  the  most  heroic  that  ever  miscarried  is  only  to  emphasize  the  for- 
midableness  of  the  obstacles  that  opposed  it. 

When  we  look  into  the  particulars,  we  ficd,  in  comparison  with 
the  government  which  it  strove  to  throw  off,  that  it  was  deficient  in 
every  element  that  could  affect  the  result  of  such  an  enterprise  but 
courage;  indeed,  we  shall  be  amazed  that  four  years  of  gigantic  ef- 
fort were  required  for  its  overthrow,  if  we  lose  sight  of  the  vigor  of 
the  resistance,  and  the  inherent  difficulty  of  overcoming  any  organ- 


28 

Why  The  G(xxifQ&Qt&c$  Failed. 

iz  =.d  revolt  of  such  proportions.  We  find  it  completely  shut  in  from 
foreign  intercourse;  we  find  it  relatively  deficient  in  men  and  mon- 
ey and  resources  of  every  sort,  in  military  equipment,  in  facilities 
for  interior  communication,  in  mechanical  appliances,  in  the  me- 
chanical skill  which  so  much  aided  the  armies  of  its  adversary,  in 
that  material  development  which  occupies  so  important  a  place  in 
modern  civilization,  in  foreign  confidence  and  sympathy,  in  internal 
confidence  as  well,  and  in  that  profound  popular  impulse  'which 
continually  strengthened  the  armies  of  its  opponent,  and  threw  the 
whole  energy  of  the  North  into  the  contest. 

Certainly  the  early  stage  of  the  war  was  marked  by  great  enthu- 
siasm and  bitterness  on  the  part  of  the  South,  especially  among  the 
upper  classes,  and  the  losing  cause  was  followed  with  fidelity  to  the 
end.  The  Union  sentiment  in  the  North  was  as  strong,  as  enthusi- 
astic, and  more  general;  and  there  was  besides,  in  an  already  domi- 
nating and  growing  element,  a  motive  that  was  stronger  and  more 
enduring  than  enthusiasm — an  implacable  antagonism  which  acted 
side  by  side  with  the  cause  of  the  Union  as  a  perpetual  impelling 
force  against  the  social  conditions  of  the  South,  controlling  the 
counsels  of  the  government,  cadencing  the  maich  of  its  armies  to 
the  chorus: 

"John  Brown's  body  lies  mouldering  in  the  grave, 
But  his  soul  is  marching  on." 

There  was  Irom  the  first  but  one  reasonable  chance  for  the  survi- 
val of  the  Confederacy,  and  that  lay  in  foreign  intervention.  Recog- 
nition alone  would  not  have  availed.  How  long  the  contest  would 
have  been  protracted  by  such  interference,  and  what  might  have 
been  the  ultimate  consequences,  are  questions  which  it  is  not  pleas- 
ant for  an  American  and  a  lover  of  civil  liberty  to  contemplate. 

In  a  conflict  of  such  magnitude  as  our  Civil  War,  it  followed  nat- 
urally that  economic  and  military  policies  should  exert  an  impor- 
tant influence.  Mere  promissory  money  would  be  apt  to  cause  em- 
barassment,  but  not  fatally  so  in  the  isolated  condition  of  the  Con- 
federacy so  long  as  it  satisfied  the  conditions' of  interior  trade.  In- 
trinsically the  greenbacks  of  the  North  were  no  better  than  the  pa- 
per promises  of  the  South;  yet  they  constituted  virtually  the  sole 
circulating  medium,  were  received  with  confidence,  and  the  coun- 
try was  commercially  prosperous  during  the  war.  In  the  North  the 
use  of  such  money  was  a  policy  or  device.  In  the  South  it  was  a 
necessity;  for,  unable  to  borrow  money  abroad,  if  direct  taxation 
could  have  been  resorted  to  it  would  have  been  futile:  the  country  did 
not  possess  wealth  enough  in  an  available  form  for  the  emergency. 

The  failure  of  the  financial  expedient  thus  adopted  by  the  South 
from  necessity,  without  any  foundation  of  material  value,  became 
inevitable  as  soon  as  it  lost  the  confidence  of  the  public.     If  there 


39 

Wh#  Tto  ®(xntetetncy  Failed. 

was  at  the  time  no  other  symptom  of  a  distrust  of  their  cause,  the 
rejection  of  the  money  of  the  Confederacy  by  the  people  was  a  suf- 
ficient sign  of  a  lack  of  faith.  The  bad  money  was  a  consequence, 
not  a  cause. 

The  policy  of  dispersion,  as  it  is  called,  in  the  military  opera* 
tions  has  been  criticized  on  both  sides,  but  not  with  convincing  ar- 
gument. The  conflict  was  not  of  a  nature  to  be  decided  by  a  single 
campaign,  or  on  purely  strategic  grounds.  The  mission  of  the  Fed- 
eral government  was  to  invade,  put  down  armed  opposition,  and 
restore  its  authority;  and  the  largeness  of  the  force  called  to  the 
task  permitted,  indeed  required,  its  employment  in  different  fields  of 
operation  at  the  same  time.  Correspondingly  all  the  circumstances 
of  the  occasion  imposed  upon  the  Confederates  the  general  plan  of 
a  popular  defensive  war.  Apart  from  the  necessity  of  securing  the 
resources  of  every  portion  of  their  territory,  by  just  so  far  as  the 
Confederate  forces  consolidated  might  by  superior  skill  cope  success- 
fully with  the  superior  numbers  of  their  opponent,  by  so  far  within 
judicious  limits  might  their  successes  be  multiplied  by  division  a- 
gainst  their  divided  adversary. 

There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  a  more  extensive  or  a  different 
use  of  cavalry  would  have  changed  the  result  of  the  war.  The  Con- 
federacy was  no  better  able  to  secure  supremacy  in  that  arm  than 
in  any  other.  The  probability  is  strongly  to  the  contrary,  and  the 
South  had  most  to  apprehend  from  rivalry  in  that  direction. 

But  no  explanation  of  the  triumph  of  the  Union  cause  could  be 
more  superficial  and  erroneous  than  that  which  would  ascribe  the 
result  to  military  leadership,  however  meritorious,  rather  than  to 
the  immense  momentum  of  popular  will  and  intelligence  which  ani- 
mated and  directed  the  population  of  the  North.  That  power  found 
an  efficient  preliminary  organizer  in  the  State  governments — that 
peculiar  feature  of  "imperium  in  imperio"  in  our  political  system, 
which,  however  it  may  tend  to  preserve  the  liberties  of  the  citizen, 
may  in  some  future  crisis  prove  as  powerful  an  agent  for  evil  to  the 
nation  as  in  this  instance  it  was  fruitful  of  good  to  both.  It  did  not 
contribute  as  much  to  the  Confederate  cause  in  the  South  as  it  did 
to  the  cause  of  the  Union  in  the  North. 

In  these  brief  notes  upon  the  chances  of  the  Confederacy  I  make 
no  reference  to  the  so-called  teachings  of  history,  which  often  fail  to 
elucidate  satisfactorily  the  questions  to  which  we  apply  them.  Mere- 
over  the  conditions  of  the  civilization  of  the  present  day — especially 
in  their  bearing  upon  military  science  and  the  mission  of  civil  gov. 
ernment — are  too  unlike  those  of  even  a  hundred  years  ago  to 
make  it  safe  to  draw  comparisons  of  action  without  the  most  care- 
ful analysis. 

D.  C.  Bueil. 


30 

Whg  The  QcmUfotucy  Faited. 

BT   O.   O.    HOWARD,    MAJOR  GENERAL,   U.    S.    A.   RETIRED. 

While  I  do  not  agree  with  a  number  of  Mr.  Rose's  postulates,  bis 
article  presents  a  number  of  important  points  worthy  of  study  and 
thought. 

It  was  long  my  favorite  theory,  born  of  my  deepest  conviction, 
and  expressed  in  a  letter  to  the  "New  York  Times"  at  the  very  be- 
ginning of  the  war,  that  the  Union  arms  would  never  be  successful 
until  the  government  aimed  directly  and  indirectly  with  all  its  pow- 
er at  the  extinction  of  human  slavery.  With  reference  to  the  in- 
trinsic wrong  in  slavery,  I  believe  the  whole  nation  participated  in 
its  perpetuation,  and  that  this  fact  affected  the  morale  of  our  peo- 
ple and  our  armies.  When,  after  terrible  chastisement,  our  morale 
followed  the  divine  leading,  success  became  continuous  and  finally 
complete. 

In  fervor,  devotion  to  a  cause,  and  persistency,  there  was  doubt- 
less little  difference  between  the  governments,  peoples,  and  soldiers 
of  the  South  and  North. 

1.  The  Confederate  government  promised  to  pay  dollars  [gold  or 
silver]  six  months  after  recognition  of  the  Confederacy  by  the  Uni- 
ted States.  These  promises,  used  as  currency,  naturally  depreciated 
as  their  volume  increased  and  the  likelihood  of  success  lessened. 
But  all  peoples  subjected  to  extraordinary  expenses  are  wont  to 
throw  part  of  the  cost  upon  the  future.  The  Union  government  did 
the  same  in  the  Civil  War.  It  was  hardly  possible  for  the  Confed- 
eracy to  avoid  the  issue  of  these  promises.  Their  reckless  issue  to- 
ward the  end  was  like  the  straw  at  which  the  drowning  man  catch- 
es; it  was  an  endeavor  to  keep  the  Confederate  armies  together  for 
a  little  space  while  the  government  looked  and  prayed  for  Euro- 
pean help. 

At  last  the  South  was  fairly  exhausted.  The  worthless  paper 
money  was  only  an  incident.  In  some  localities,  at  every  period  of 
the  war  there  was  much  baled  cotton;  and  though  it  commanded  a 
high  price  anywhere  outside  the  blockading  squadron,  within  the 
Confederacy  it  was  of  little  value,  as  it  could  be  neither  eaten  nor 
shot  at  the  enemy. 

2.  "The  policy  of  dispersion"  referred  to  I  deem  a  necessity;  for 
as  soon  as  any  portions  of  the  seceded  States  were  held  by  the 
Union  army  they  contributed  nothing  to  the  Confederacy,  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  furnished  supplies  to  the  United  States.  As  men 
understood  the  art  of  war  in  1861,  the  military  administration  of 
the  South  could  hardly  have  been  excelled.  It  is  true  that  the  ar- 
mies under  Lee  and  Johnston  were  hampered  at  times  by  a  weak 
government;  but  all  governments  are  human,  and  liable  to  weak- 
ness in  organization  and  mistakes  in  operation. 


31 

Why  Ths  GanUtetficy  Failed. 

Following  a  reaction  against  Napoleon's  system,  the  war  in  the 
Crimea,  as  well  as  our  own  in  its  earlier  stages,  made  much  of  strat- 
egic positions.  After  General  Grant's  series  of  demonstrations  in 
battle,  we  now  clearly  see  that  the  objective  should  have  been  the 
enemy's  active  army.  The  danger  to  the  respective  capitals  was 
indeed  a  great  bugbear;  for  as  long  as  either  side  had  a  well-equip- 
ped army,  the  capture  of  either  capital  would  have  been  only  an  ad- 
vantage, not  a  conclusive  victory.  Certainly  the  strategic  theory 
or  the  political  situation  caused  the  shedding  of  much  blood  and  the 
expenditure  of  much  treasure,  which  from  a  purely  military  point 
of  view  was  a  sad  waste.  The  endeavor  should  have  been  to  de- 
stroy the  opposing  army. 

S.  It  takes  long  training  to  make  effective  cavalry,  even  if  raw 
recruits  can  ride.  The  use  of  horses  to  transport  troops  rapidly 
from  point  to  point  for  the  purpose  of  fighting  on  foot  was  develop- 
ed during  the  war.  Confederate  generals  found  that  such  cavalry 
as  they  could  raise  was  very  expensive  and  hard  to  keep  efficient. 
As  soon  as  they  bad  had  a  little  experience  in  battle,  it  was 
not  the  nature  of  our  armies  to  become  so  demoralized  after  defeat 
that  cavalry  could  overrun  and  destroy  them.  Shiloh,  Chicamauga, 
and  Malvern  Hill  were  hardly  victories  for  the  Confederacy,  and 
even  Fredericksburg  became  so  only  because  the  Union  army  failed 
to  carry  a  position.  It  withdrew  without  loss  of  organization.  The 
reason  the  Confederates  did  not  gain  in  these  more  decisive  advan- 
tage was  not  because  they  were  weak  in  cavalry,  but  because  of  the 
stamina  of  the  withdrawing  troops.  Union  victories,  so  called,  were 
many,  but  were  not  decisive,  except  in  a  few  instances,  because  of 
the  stamina  of  the  Confederate  soldiers. 

During  the  Rebellion  we  lived  under  a  constitution  which  some- 
what checked  our  raising  money.  These  provisions  were  copied  in- 
to the  Confederate  constitution.  Doubtless  there  was  some  disabil- 
ity here,  but  now  we  could  constitutionally  increase  our  income  from 
the  internal-revenue  taxes  by  adding  other  articles  to  the  list  suf- 
ficiently to  carry  on  a  foreign  war — that  is  if  public  opinion  would 
permit.  Still,  should  war  come,  part  of  its  expenses  would  doubt- 
less be  thrown  over  to  the  future  by  the  government  borrowing 
money.  In  reference  to  losses  from  the  "policy  of  dispersion",  our 
principal  sea-coast  cities  must  be  defended  as  naval  depots;  after 
that,  the  objective  should  always  be  the  destruction  of  any  hostile 
army  landing  on  our  shores  or  entering  our  country  from  the  North 
or  the  South. 

Mr.  Rose  is  mistaken  in  the  matter  of  the  assignment  of  West 
Point  graduates.  No  "dullard"  is  graduated  at  West  Point.  Clas- 
ses which  begin  with  more  than  a  hundred  usually  graduate  less 
than  fifty.     Of  these  fifty,  not  more  than  five  go  into  the  engineers. 


32 

Wh#  The  GtmU&et&cy  Failed. 

The  other  graduates  are  always  allowed  a  choice  of  arms  according 
to  their  class  standing.  The  cavalry  vacancies  are  generally  all  fil- 
led before  the  members  of  a  lower  half  of  a  class  have  bad  a  chance 
to  select. 

Again,  I  should  say  that  an  invasion  of  Canada,  even  without  an 
extraordinary  cavalry  force,  could  be  made  an  effective  military  op- 
eration, though  a  good  cavalry  force  is,  of  course,  always  desirable. 
Its  efficiency  under  Sheridan,  however,  [and  it  would  be  more  so 
now]  was  not  so  much  from  the  old  cavalry  impact,  as  from  the  ad- 
vantage gained  by  transferring  men  with  good  arms  from  point  to 
point  with  rapidity.  Surely  the  writer  undervalues  General  J.  E. 
B.  Stuart  as  a  cavalry  leader.  His  view  probably  arises  from  his 
partiality  for  the  energy  and  enterprise  of  General  Forrest. 

Oliver  0.  Howard. 

BT   JACOB   D.    COX,    MAJOR-GENERAL    C.   S.    V. 

In  all  great  historical  events  the  causes  co-operating  to  produce  the 
result  are  sure  to  be  numerous —  so  numerous  that  it  would  hardly 
be  wrong  to  call  them  numberless.  The  student  of  history  gets  so 
accustomed  to  crises  in  which  a  slight  change  of  circumstance  or  con- 
duct would,  apparently,  have  given  a  wholly  different  trend  to  af- 
fairs, that  he  gives  up  the  problem  of  the  "might  have  beens"  as 
one  impossible  of  solution.  Yet  there  is  so  much  that  is  fascinatng 
in  such  speculations  that  we  may  be  sure  many  another  Southerner 
besides  Mr.  Rose  has  spent  long  hours  of  wistful  thought  upon  his 
question,  though  not  many  have  so  persuasively  presented  an  an- 
swer. 

Yet  when  he  dismisses  the  answer  that  it  was  contrary  to  the  will 
of  Providence  that  the  South  should  win,  does  he  not  miss  some  of 
the  reasons  contained  in  that  solution  of  the  matter  ?  Many  an 
earnest  Southern  man  now  sees  and  acknowledges  that  "all  has 
turned  out  for  the  best",  which  is  only  another  way  of  saying  that 
a  superior  wisdom  and  a  more  potent  will  than  theirs  was  ruling 
the  world;  and  they  find  consolation  in  the  thought.  Then  we 
must  remember  that  this  view  does  not  imply  a  mere  arbitrary  fiat. 
Under  a  reign  of  law  it  means  a  supremely  wise  adaptation  of 
means  to  ends  and  causes  to  effects,  if  we  are  only  able  to  trace 
them. 

For  instance,  except  for  the  fact  that  the  system  of  slavery  was 
in  conflict  with  the  public  opinion  of  the  civilized  world,  there  would 
seem  to  be  little  doubt  that  both  France  and  England  would  have 
intervened  actively  in  behalf  of  the  Confederacy.  When  we  read 
the  evidence  of  the  embarassment  of  the  statesmen   of  those   coun- 


33 

Wh#  The  Gbtite&etficy  Failed. 

tries  in  the  presence  of  the  necessity  of  deciding  whether  they  would 
join  in  a  war  to  establish  a  new  nation  on  the  basis  of  African  slav- 
ery, we  are  made  to  feel  strongly  that  a  moral  force  was  at  work 
here  that  was  great  enough  to  account  for  the  difference  between 
success  or  failure  in  even  so  gigantic  a  struggle.  The  summary  of 
facts  bearing  on  this  point  which  Mr.  Rhodes  has  given  in  the  fif- 
teenth and  sixteenth  chapters  of  bis  "History  of  the  United  States" 
is  very  instructive.  But  this  nonintervention  made  possible  the 
great  blockade  of  two  thousand  miles  of  sea-coast,  depriving  the 
Confederacy  of  a  foreign  commerce  which  was  a  vital  factor  both  in 
marketing  her  own  products  and  in  procuring  munitions  of  war. 

Mr.  Rose  has  sketched  with  no  little  power  the  mischiefs  which 
resulted  from  unlimited  issues  of  irredeemable  paper  money;  but 
can  we  call  it  a  principal  cause  of  the  Confederate  failure?  France 
did  not  fail  in  her  struggle  with  Europe  because  of  the  worthless- 
ness  of  her  assignats.  They  were  swept  into  her  dust-bins,  and 
she  began  again  on  a  sounder  financial  basis,  and  carried  her  ea- 
gles across  the  continent.  We  of  the  North  also  suffered  from  pa- 
per issued  on  doubtful  credit,  and  even  the  statesman  who  issued  it 
lived  to  declare,  as  Chief  Justice,  with  noble  frankness,  that  the 
constitutional  powers  of  the  government  had  been  strained  in  doing 
so,  and  that  the  desperate  resort  to  war  powers  must  end,  at  least, 
when  peace  was  achieved. 

It  is  easy  for  us  now  to  argue  that  the  Confederate  notes  as  well 
our  own  were  bad  finance;  but  the  true  reason  for  their  issue  was 
that  the  statesmen  in  power  on  both  sides  did  not  believe  that  the 
people  would  stand  the  enormous  taxation  required  to  "pay  as  you 
go".  They  looked  for  refusal  to  support  war  measures  and  war  ad- 
ministrations when  the  burden  of  taxation  should  be  oppressively  felt. 
They  may  have  been  wrong,  but  they  were  able  politicians,  and  we 
must  not  be  too  confident  that  they  misjudged  the  situation. 

To  examine  the  causes  of  success  and  failure  on  both  sides  is  too 
large  a  task  for  condensation  into  a  page,  and  one  can  only  suggest 
that  Mr.  Rose,  in  bis  contention  that  the  Confederate  armies  fought 
without  necessity  on  "indefensible  frontiers",  seems  to  use  the  term 
in  a  questionable  way.  The  frontier  in  the  West  was  virtually  the 
Ohio  River.  Fort  Donelson,  Murfreesboro',  Sbilob,  Vicksburg, 
Chattanooga,  Atlanta  made  a  line  of  interior  positions  in  the  very 
heart  of  the  country  from  which  the  Confederate  government  must 
draw  its  resources  till  Sherman  completed  the  dissevering  by  the 
march  to  the  sea,  and  thence  north  to  the  capital  of  North  Carolina. 

A  similar  brief  suggestion  as  to  the  advantage  of  cavalry  must 
limit  what  I  can  say.  The  cavalry  which  Mr.  Rose  advocates  are 
the  horsemen  of  European  armies,  trained  by  years  of  severe  drill 
and  instruction  of  both  man  and  beast  to  produce    effects   by   the 


34 

l&hg  Thje  Q&nfe&Qt&cy  Failed* 

"shock"  of  galloping  thousands  using  the  lance  or  saber.  It  was 
well  known  that  there  was  neither  time  nor  opportunity  to  produce 
such  cavalry  in  our  Civil  War,  and  most  men  of  military  experi- 
rience  still  think  the  character  of  the  country  would  have  made 
their  use  in  large  bodies  impracticable.  Our  use  of  hofses  was  only 
to  carry  men  quickly  to  the  desired  position,  when  they  dismounted 
and  fought  on  foot  with  carbines  much  inferior  in  range  and  caliber 
to  the  infantry  weapons.  General  Forrest  openly  discarded  sabers, 
and  was  the  most  pronounced  advocate  of  dependence  on  the  car- 
bine and  revolver  in  such  country  as  our  Western  and  Southern 
States. 

Is  it  not  reasonable  then  to  conclude  that  the  heavier  battalions 
of  the  Northern  army,  persistently  advancing  into  the  Confederate 
States,  and  aided  by  the  moral  causes  first-mentioned,  secured  re- 
suits  which  are  consistent  at  once  with  military  principles  and  with 
the  purposes  of  Providence  in  regard  to  America  ? 

Jacob  D.  Cox. 


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• 


I      J. 


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. 


Binder 
Gaylord  Bros. 

Syracuse,  N.  Y. 

PAT.  JAN  21,  1908 


UNIVERSITY  OF  N.C.  AT  CHAPEL  HILL 


00032721225 

FOR  USE  ONLY  IN 


THE  NORTH  CAROLINA  COLLECTION 


:  '"."■■■■:-.;  /■■■■'■.■■■■• 


